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PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS  
AND THE PRINCIPLED APPROACH:  
CAN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA  
HAVE U.(F.J.) CAKE AND EAT IT TOO?
LANA WALKER†
ABSTRACT
The principled approach to the admission of hearsay took a surprising 
turn in 2000 when the Supreme Court of Canada handed down R. v. 
Starr. The Starr decision severely restricted the type of evidence that 
could   be   examined   at   the   threshold   reliability   stage,   confining   the  
analysis to the circumstances under which the statement was made and 
declaring that external evidence could no longer be considered in the 
analysis. Despite Starr’s holding, courts have continued to consider 
external evidence when assessing threshold reliability. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in U.(F.J.) may be responsible for this inconsistency. 
Although prior inconsistent statement hearsay was at issue in U.(F.J.), 
courts dealing with both prior inconsistent statement and declarant-
unavailable hearsay have cited U.(F.J.)’s principles, which has led to 
great analytical confusion. However, R. v. Khelawon represents a step 
toward analytical consistency, as the Ontario Court of Appeal sheds 
some light on the issue and purports to make some sense out of the 
analytical confusion at the threshold reliability stage.
† Lana Walker is a third year student at Dalhousie Law School.  She is planning to 
complete her LL.M in the area of evidence law in 2007.  She will be joining the British 
Columbia bar in 2008.
242 – DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
INTRODUCTION
The “hearsay revolution,” sparked by the court’s adoption of the prin-
cipled approach, has made great strides to ensure consistency in the ad-
mission of hearsay evidence, but has also created additional complexity. 
Although R. v. Starr1 represents the Supreme Court of Canada’s latest 
word on the application of the principled approach to declarant-unavail-
able hearsay,2 courts have continued to deviate from its framework due 
to confusion and disagreement on how to adapt the older jurisprudence 
to the new approach. Indeed, this is evident with the struggle to adapt 
R. v. U.(F.J.) 3 into the principled analysis, particularly in light of Starr. 
It has been theorized that U.(F.J.) represents an exception to the ban 
on extrinsic evidence in the threshold reliability analysis.4 This article 
will demonstrate that this theory is incorrect. Rather, as held by Jus-
tice Rosenberg in R. v. Khelawon, 5 U.(F.J.) falls within the declarant-
available hearsay category, and is not an exception to the rules guiding 
the declarant-unavailable jurisprudence. However, rather than chalking 
U.(F.J.)  up  as  an  anomaly  or  confining  it  to  the  declarant-­available  cat-
egory, courts have hinged on the “exception” that it created, stretching 
it beyond its limits into declarant-unavailable territory, and impeding 
logical jurisprudential development within the principled approach.
This article will illustrate that the confusion and inconsistency with-
in the principled approach stems from a failure to acknowledge that two 
analytical models exist at the threshold reliability stage: one for declar-
ant-unavailable hearsay dictated by the R. v. Khan,6 R. v. Smith,7 and 
Starr authorities, and the other for declarant-available hearsay emerging 
1  [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144, 190 D.L.R. (4th) 591 [Starr]. 
2 For referential consistency throughout the argument, “declarant-unavailable hear-
say” will refer to situations in which the declarant is absent from court, while “de-
clarant-available hearsay” will be analogous to “prior inconsistent statements”, and is 
contingent upon an in-court declarant.
3  [1995] 3 S.C.R. 764, S.C.J. No. 82 [U.(F.J.)].
4  Khelawon, infra note 5 at para. 32, 36-38. See also Hamish Stewart, “A Rationale 
for the Rejection of Extrinsic Evidence in Assessing the Reliability of Hearsay” 
(2005) 30 C.R. (6th) 306 at 313 [Stewart]. 
5  [2005] O.J. No.723, 195 O.A.C. 11, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2005] 
S.C.C.A. No. 153 [Khelawon].
6  [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531, S.C.J. No. 81 [Khan].
7  [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915, 94 D.L.R. (4th) 590 [Smith].
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from the R. v. B.(K.G.)8 and U.(F.J.) lineage. The overall discussion will 
reveal that there are two factors contributing to the analytical confusion 
within the principled approach. First, the restriction placed by Iacobucci 
J. on threshold reliability has motivated courts to sidestep his analysis 
in Starr and drive them to U.(F.J.)’s “exception,” which has been used 
to consider evidence beyond the circumstances in which a statement 
was made in assessing threshold reliability for declarant-unavailable 
hearsay.9 Second, the courts’ failure to recognize that U.(F.J.) is not an 
exception to Starr, but rather a peculiar piece within the prior inconsist-
ent statement puzzle only affecting declarant-available hearsay, has led 
to an irrational blending between the declarant-available and declarant-
unavailable analyses. 
 This analytical slue has created uncertain legal results, which 
threatens the fair treatment of victims, witnesses, and the accused. As 
Justice Rosenberg emphasized in Khelawon, the hearsay rule is multi-
purposed, serving “both evidentiary and procedural goals” by “ensur[ing] 
that only trustworthy evidence is admitted” and recognizing that the ac-
cused’s interest to due process and a fair trial must be protected.10
This  paper  is  divided  into  four  parts.  Part  I  will  briefly  outline  re-
cent developments guiding the principled approach. Part II will high-
light prior inconsistent statements’ debut within the principled approach 
through B.(K.G.) and U.(F.J.). In Part III, several lower court decisions 
will be summarized to demonstrate that while some courts have recog-
nized the divide between the declarant-available and declarant-unavail-
able hearsay categories, others have obscured the boundary.  Finally, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Khelawon will be examined, as it 
highlights the discrepancies between Starr and U.(F.J.), and represents 
a step toward analytical consistency. 
I. THE DEBUT OF THE PRINCIPLED APPROACH
In the early 1990s, Chief Justice Lamer declared that Khan signalled 
a  change  in  evidence  law  and  that  hearsay  not  fitting  within  the  tradi-
tional categorical exceptions would now be admissible on a principled 
8  [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740, S.C.J. No. 22 [B.(K.G.)].
9  Khelawon, supra note 5 at para. 32.
10 Khelawon, supra note 5 at para. 107.
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basis – “the governing principles being the reliability of the evidence, 
and its necessity.”11 Courts and commentators accepted the Khan and 
Smith  rulings  as  residual  “catch-­alls”  for  hearsay  unfit  for  the  traditional  
categories.12 The jurisprudence was leaning towards an open hearsay 
analysis that broadened a trial judge’s ability to admit reliable evidence. 
However, this trend shifted in 2000, when the Supreme Court of Canada 
rendered its ruling in Starr. 
1.  R v. Starr
Iacobucci J.’s decision in Starr   wrought   significant   and   unexpected  
changes to the traditional hearsay exceptions.13 Iacobucci J. sparked 
controversy by stating that, when assessing threshold reliability,  
[T]he trial judge should not consider the declarant’s general 
reputation for truthfulness, nor any prior or subsequent statements, 
consistent or not. These factors do not concern the circumstances of 
the statement itself. Similarly, I would not consider the presence of 
corroborating  or  conflicting  evidence.14
Although Iacobucci J.’s analysis did not emerge as a logical progres-
sion from the preceding Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, he 
followed both the United States Supreme Court’s approach in Idaho v. 
Wright15 and the Ontario Court of Appeal’s approach prior to Starr.16 
Despite this, the Court’s ruling in Starr proved both “controversial and 
restrictive.”17 
11  Smith, note 7 at para. 32.
12  Lee Stuesser “R. v. Starr and Reform of the Hearsay Exceptions” (2001), 7 Can. 
Crim. Law Rev. 55 at 56 [Stuesser]. 
13  Ibid.
14  Starr, supra note 1 at para. 217 [emphasis added]. 
15  Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
16  R. v. Merz (1999), 46 O.R. (3d) 161, [1999] O.J. No. 4309 at para. 51 (“[e]vidence 
from other witnesses which is consistent with the substance of an out-of-court 
statement is not a circumstance surrounding the making of that statement and cannot 
generally be seen as diminishing the risks associated with the admission of hearsay 
evidence”) [Merz]; See especially R. v. Conway (1997), 121 C.C.C. (3d) 397, [1997] 
O.J. No. 5224 at para. 43-45. 
17  Don Stuart, “Starr and Parrott: Favouring Exclusion of Hearsay to Protect Rights 
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 In narrowing threshold reliability to “whether or not the circum-
stances surrounding the statement provide circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness,” Iacobucci J. effectively prohibited corroborating evi-
dence from entering the threshold reliability analysis.18 This restriction 
proved puzzling. Pre-Starr commentators argued that while threshold 
reliability “may have traditionally focused on a narrow inquiry into the 
circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, a rigid adher-
ence to this approach [could not] be countenanced in a new era of hear-
say cases.”19   Iacobucci  J.’s  confined  approach  also  contrasted  sharply  
with Justice McLachlin’s open analysis in Khan.20 As evidenced in 
Khan, corroborating evidence “ha[d] long been an important tool used 
by trial judges in determining admissibility,” which made Iacobucci J.’s 
holding perplexing.21
 Although Iacobucci J. expressly stated that evidence going be-
yond the circumstances in which a statement was made should not be 
considered in assessing threshold reliability, extrinsic evidence has con-
tinued to creep into the threshold reliability analysis post-Starr.22 This 
tendency typically relies on the prior inconsistent statement authorities 
and, in particular, the “U.F.J. exception.”23 As the following analysis 
will demonstrate, this reliance is faulty, as courts faced with declarant-
unavailable hearsay should not be drawing on the declarant-available 
authorities.
of Accused” (2001) 39 C.R. (5th) 284 at 286. See also David M. Tanovich, “Starr 
Gazing: Looking into the Future of Hearsay in Canada” (2003) 28 Queen’s L.J. 371 
at 401-02 [Tanovich].
18  Starr, supra note 1 at para. 215.
19  Laurie Lacelle, “The Role of Corroborating Evidence in Assessing the Reliability 
of Hearsay Statements for Substantive Purposes” (1999) 19 C.R. (5th) 376 at 392 
[Lacelle].
20  Khan, supra note 6 at para. 30. 
21  David M. Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence 3rd ed. (Toronto: Irwin 
Law, 2002) at 118 [Paciocco].
22  Starr, supra note 1 at para. 217. 
23  Khelawon, supra note 5 at paras.32.
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II. PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
1. “I Said What?”
Prior inconsistent statements are a challenging form of hearsay because, 
although the hearsay declarant may be cross-examined, there is often 
difficulty  manifest   in   deciding   “whether   [or   not]   to   prefer   an   out-­of-­
court statement to a witness’s own evidence at trial.”24 With the 1993 
decision of B.(K.G.), prior inconsistent statements found new life as 
evidence that could be used to prove the truth of their contents by apply-
ing the principled approach to declarant-available hearsay. In making 
the move to regard prior inconsistent statements as potentially accept-
able hearsay, Chief Justice Lamer addressed the hearsay dangers in the 
declarant-available context.25 In speaking for the Court, he held that:
[E]vidence of prior inconsistent statements of a witness other than 
an accused should be substantively admissible on a principled basis, 
following this Court’s decisions in Khan and Smith. However, it is 
clear  that  the  factors  identified  in  those  cases  –  reliability  and  necessity  
–  must  be  adapted  and  refined  in  this  particular  context,  given  the  
particular problems raised by the nature of such statements.26
 Justice Cory agreed that Khan and Smith do “provide an alter-
native  justification”  for  admitting  prior  inconsistent  statements  for  sub-
stantive  purposes,  and  held  that  “their  unmodified  application  to  prior  
inconsistent statements would [not] adequately protect the interests of 
the accused from the potential dangers that surround the introduction of 
statements made in court.”27 However, he differed on where he would 
place  his  analytical  limitations,  finding  the  Chief  Justice’s  reliability  in-
dicators too restrictive.28 Justice Cory’s reasoning foreshadows the sub-
sequent case law, as courts are tending to push the analysis towards his 
limits. 
24  Lacelle, supra note 19 at 386.
25  B.(K.G.), supra note 8 at paras. 86-104.
26  B.(K.G.), supra note 8 at para. 73. 
27  B.(K.G.), supra note 8 at para. 126. 
28  B.(K.G.), supra note 8 at para. 126.
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Although  the  Chief  Justice  specified  very  strict  reliability  indicators,  
he also stipulated that substitute “circumstantial guarantees of reliabil-
ity” could satisfy the reliability requirement, which would be assessed 
according to the individual judge’s discretion.29 A mere two years later, 
the Supreme Court of Canada revisited this proposition in U.(F.J.), in 
which Chief Justice Lamer admitted a prior inconsistent statement in the 
absence of the B.(K.G.) requirements.30 
The prior inconsistent statements in U.(F.J.) were of questionable 
reliability,   as   they  were  not  given  under  oath  or  warning,   and  officer  
notes constituted their only record.31 Despite these warnings signs, 
Chief Justice Lamer admitted the complainant’s statement for its truth. 
In doing so, the Chief Justice expanded the circumstances in which a 
prior inconsistent statement could be used for substantive purposes by 
indicating that “a threshold of reliability can sometimes be established, 
in cases where the witness is available for cross-examination, by a strik-
ing similarity between two statements.” 32 Chief Justice Lamer cautioned 
that striking similarities would only go to enhancing threshold reliabil-
ity “when there is a basis for rejecting […] alternative explanations.” 33 
Determining this basis requires the trial judge to look beyond “circum-
stantial guarantees of reliability” and necessarily involves a considera-
tion of external evidence.34
 The Chief Justice’s holding was substantial. However, his in-
dication that “striking similarities” between two statements may suf-
fice  threshold  reliability  only  if  at  least  one  statement  is  “clearly  sub-
stantively admissible” is curious, because in U.(F.J.) neither statement 
was  sufficiently  reliable  on  its  own.35 Despite this discrepancy, U.(F.J.) 
has been accepted as good law, condoning an approach that “permits 
a form of corroborat[ing] evidence to function in the reliability analy-
sis.”36 However, this “loophole” should not be extended to the threshold 
29  B.(K.G.), supra note 8 at para. 104.
30  U.(F.J.), supra note 3.
31  U.(F.J.), supra note 3 at paras. 4-5.
32  U.(F.J.), supra note 3 at para. 40 [emphasis added]. 
33  U.(F.J.), supra note 3 at para. 40.
34  U.(F.J.), supra note 3 at para. 39.
35  U.(F.J.), supra note 3 at para. 49.
36  Lacelle, supra note 19 at 383.
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reliability analysis of declarant-unavailable hearsay, a caveat which has 
been overlooked and which will be explored in Part III. 
2. Steer Away From Starr
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision to admit prior inconsistent 
statements for the truth of their contents does not mean that the thresh-
old reliability analyses for declarant-available and declarant-unavailable 
hearsay must mirror one another. The ability to cross-examine the de-
clarant  and  the  need  to  have  specific  reliability  indicators  in  the  analysis,  
represent compelling reasons to have different analytical frameworks 
for each category. As Justice Blair stated in Khelawon, “different con-
siderations may apply where the accused has had the opportunity to 
cross-examine the declarant as in R. v. B.(K.G.), [and] R. v. U.(F.J.).”37 
Similarly, in R. v. Auger,38 the Northwest Territories Supreme Court rec-
ognized  that  specific  assurances  have  been  built  into  the  threshold  reli-
ability  analysis  that  are  specific  to  declarant-­available  hearsay,  and  that  
any “exceptions to the various precautions which are to be put in place 
to try to assure reliability will be narrow.”39 
III. STARR, MEET U.(F.J.)
1. A Murky Affair
After Starr, the law regarding threshold reliability for declarant-una-
vailable hearsay should have been clear, as Iacobucci J. undoubtedly 
indicated that a trial judge may not resort to factors going beyond the 
circumstances under which a statement was made.40 However, as dis-
cussed, the prevailing view seems to be that some exceptions can thwart 
the standard approach to threshold reliability for declarant-unavailable 
37  Khelawon, supra note 5 at para. 99.
38  [2001] N.W.T.J. No. 45, 2001 NWTSC 44.
39  Ibid. at para. 13.
40  Starr, supra note 1 at para. 217. See generally Paciocco, supra note 21 at 
115. 
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hearsay.41 The jurisprudential confusion can be traced in part to the ac-
ceptance of prior inconsistent statements as potentially admissible hear-
say. 
 Lee Stuesser questions where U.(F.J.)   fits   into   the   principled  
approach. In “R. v. Starr and Reform of the Hearsay Exceptions,” he 
argues that U.(F.J.) stands for another exception, condoning the con-
sideration of corroborative evidence in the form of “strikingly similar 
statements”  where  there  are  “insufficient  safeguards  in  place  to  meet  the  
K.G.B. requirements.”42 Stuesser’s argument is correct. U.(F.J.) must be 
taken  either  as  an  anomaly,  rendered  to  get  a  particular  result  on  specific  
facts or, alternatively, as an exception to B.(K.G.) that only applies in 
narrow circumstances within the declarant-available hearsay category. 
However, the courts have disagreed, resulting analytical discrepancies 
at the threshold reliability stage. 
2. A (Semi) Clear Dividing Line
Some courts have recognized the boundary between declarant-available 
and declarant-unavailable hearsay, and have respected the 2 categories’ 
analytical limits. 
In R. v. Czibulka,43 the trial judge followed Starr in assessing thresh-
old reliability and did not look beyond the surrounding circumstances 
in determining reliability. On appeal, Justice Rosenberg correctly char-
acterized the two threshold reliability models for declarant-unavailable 
and declarant-available hearsay.44 He held that, “[s]ince the declarant 
was not available in this case, threshold reliability turned on the Smith, 
Khan, and Starr line of cases,” and admissibility depended on the cir-
cumstances under which the evidence was produced.45 
 Similarly, in the case of R. v. Sarrazin46 confusion was evident 
in   the   trial   level   judgment,  which  was   clarified  on   appeal.   In   assess-
ing threshold reliability, Justice Roy purported to rely on “consistencies 
41  Merz, supra note 16.
42  Stuesser, supra note 12 at 73; U.(F.J.), supra note 3 at para. 42.
43  R. v. Czibulka [2004] O.J. No. 3723, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 199 at para. 22.
44  Ibid. at para. 24.
45  Ibid. at para. 26.
46  R. v. Sarrazin, [2005] O.J. No. 1404, 75 O.R. (3d) 485 [Sarrazin].
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and similarities between the various statements” made by the deceased 
declarant.47 Justice Roy clearly relied on U.(F.J.) in holding that strik-
ing similarities between the unavailable declarant’s statements could es-
tablish reliability.48 On appeal, Justice Blair held that Justice Roy’s ap-
proach was incorrect in these circumstances.49 However, Justice Roy’s 
approach would have been incorrect even under the right circumstances, 
as he did not properly apply U.(F.J.). He failed to recognize that U.(F.
J.) condones reliance on external evidence to establish “striking simi-
larities” between different declarant’s statements, not between the state-
ments of a single declarant. In any case, Justice Roy should not have 
been drawing on U.(F.J.)’s principles, since this case concerned declar-
ant-unavailable hearsay.50 
3. A Blurry Boundary
Although this section will illustrates situations where the courts have 
demonstrated greater confusion at the threshold reliability stage, the 
cases that will be discussed are similar to those in the previous section, 
where  differentiation  between  the  analyses  was  vague  or  was  clarified  
on appeal. For instance, R. v. Chrisanthopoulos51 turned on an anony-
mous 911 caller’s statement, which the Crown sought to introduce for 
the truth of its contents.52 The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge 
properly admitted the hearsay, considering only “the circumstances sur-
rounding the call” in assessing threshold reliability.53 Although the court 
found that the reliability analysis was correctly executed, it agreed with 
the Crown that:
[I]n light of the striking similarities between the event described by the 
caller and the events which occurred shortly thereafter, this was one of 
those  rare  instances,  identified  in  R.  v.  U.(F.J.)[…],  in  which  it  would  
have been permissible for the trial judge to consider the surrounding 
47  Ibid. at para. 74.
48  Ibid.
49  Ibid.
50  Ibid.
51  R. v. Chrisanthopoulos, [2003] O.J. No. 5252, 180 O.A.C. 124.
52  Ibid. at para. 4. 
53  Ibid. at para. 9.
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evidence as a means of testing the reliability of the 911 call.54  
 This holding is curious since this case did not involve prior in-
consistent statements, and the anonymous declarant was clearly not 
available  for  cross-­examination.  Further,  it  is  difficult  to  ascertain  why  
the Court of Appeal would compare an unavailable declarant’s state-
ment to events that occurred afterwards, since U.(F.J.)  specified  that  the  
correct analysis concerns striking similarities between different people’s 
statements. The Court of Appeal’s erroneous comparison between state-
ment and events indicates a misunderstanding of the particular circum-
stances that are required for U.(F.J.) to operate, and, like in Sarrazin, an 
inability to properly apply U.(F.J.)’s principles.      
 The pre-Starr case of R. v. Dubois55 involved yet another incor-
rect analysis resulting from the fuzzy divide between declarant-avail-
able and unavailable hearsay. The hearsay declarants were young boys 
who had been sexually assaulted and were not able to testify at trial. 
This was therefore a declarant-unavailable situation, indicating that 
Khan and Smith should apply. However, the trial judge decided that 
the statements passed the threshold reliability stage, relying partially on 
similarities between the children’s statements.56 On appeal, Justice Bro-
ssard cited Chief Justice Lamer in U.(F.J.), arguing that “the Supreme 
Court decided…that striking similarities between the versions of sev-
eral persons could contribute to reaching the [reliability] threshold.”57 
Like Justice Roy in Sarrazin, Justice Brossard did not execute the U.(F.
J.) analysis correctly. Although this case pre-dates Starr, Justice Bros-
sard should not have been applying U.(F.J.) in any event, as the facts did 
not involve prior inconsistent statements.
 Analytical confusion is also evident in R. v. Anderson.58 The de-
clarant was too ill to testify and therefore unavailable at trial.59 Justice 
Grannary slotted the statements into the prior inconsistent statement cat-
egory, possibly because the declarant was still alive. Starr seemed to es-
cape Grannary J’s radar. He unnecessarily acknowledged that the state-
54  Ibid.
55  R. v. Dubois, [1997] A.Q. no. 2667, 118 C.C.C. (3d) 544.
56  Ibid. at 552.
57  Ibid. at 557.
58  R. v. Anderson, [2004] B.C.J. No. 1729, BCPC 293.
59  Ibid. at para. 7-8.
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ments  “were  not  sworn  or  affirmed  and  were  not  videotaped.”60 Further, 
in conducting the reliability analysis, he went beyond the boundaries set 
out in Starr  and  considered  “items  of  reliability,”  such  as  the  “confir-
mation of [the complainant’s] statements by extraneous objective evi-
dence.61
 This overview indicates that the line between declarant-avail-
able hearsay and declarant-unavailable hearsay is murky, and is lead-
ing to faulty analyses. Courts must begin to acknowledge that the two 
hearsay categories have different histories and authorities, and are aug-
mented by concerns that are unique to either refuting a present witness’s 
testimony or admitting evidence in the absence of cross-examination. 
For these reasons, threshold reliability must remain distinct for declar-
ant-unavailable and declarant-available hearsay. 
4. Khelawon Clears It Up?
In 2005, the Ontario Court of Appeal handed down Khelawon, con-
templating the differences between the U.(F.J.) and Starr holdings and 
purporting  to  glean  some  sense  of  clarity  from  their  conflicting  princi-
ples.62 
Videotaped statements concerning allegations against Khelawon 
were taken from two declarants, who were deceased by the time of trial, 
thus bringing declarant-unavailable hearsay into issue. In admitting the 
statements, Mr. Justice Grossi averted Starr’s analytical boundaries and 
incorrectly considered external evidence such as corroborating injuries 
and the “absence of an alternative suspect.”63 However, the Court of 
Appeal excluded the statements, and in doing so, engaged in a useful 
discussion. 
 Justice Blair, dissenting in part, discusses a minority of excep-
tions to the “no corroborative evidence” rule in Starr, and cited the 
“U.F.J. exception” as particularly important to this case.64 He argues that 
“although Lamer C.J.C. created the U.(F.J.) exception in the context of 
60  Ibid. at para. 26. 
61  Ibid. at para. 39.
62  Khelawon, supra note 5.
63  Khelawon, supra note 5 at para. 33.
64  Khelawon, supra note 5 at paras. 24-25.
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the admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement where the witness was 
available for cross-examination”, he does not “see a principled impedi-
ment to extending that exception” to declarant-unavailable situations.65 
Justice Blair recognizes that there are sound reasons for distinguishing 
“between situations where the declarant is available for cross-examina-
tion and those where the declarant is not available in considering the ad-
missibility of hearsay.”66 Although he accurately separates the hearsay 
authorities, in doing so, he makes some questionable statements. 
In justifying U.(F.J.)’s survival after Starr, he argues that “[t]he Su-
preme Court did not state that it was overruling itself in U.(F.J.), a clear-
ly articulated and well-recognized prior authority.”67  As  further  justifi-
cation, Justice Blair points out that Iacobucci J.’s reference to U.(F.J.) in 
Starr indicates that U.(F.J.) was not overruled by Starr.68 One wonders 
why the same argument cannot be made for Khan, as Iacobucci J. also 
cited Khan.69 While he did not state that he was overruling Khan, cor-
roborative evidence can no longer be considered in the threshold relia-
bility analysis, and therefore by implication, Starr has overruled Khan.70 
In considering this, Justice Blair states that while “it is not necessary 
as a matter of law, had the court intended to overrule itself on such a 
well-­defined  point  as  that  made  in  U.(F.J.), [he] would have expected it 
to have said so, and to have conducted at least a minimal analysis of the 
guidelines.”71 Once again, Iacobucci J.’s treatment of Khan in Starr sug-
gests that Justice Blair’s reasoning for why U.(F.J.) was not overruled 
by Starr  may  be  flawed,   as  Khan was taken as being overruled with 
absolutely no corresponding analysis.72
 While attempting to reconcile U.(F.J.) and Starr by demonstrat-
ing how and when U.(F.J.) applies to declarant-unavailable hearsay, 
Justice Blair misses the point: U.(F.J.)’s analysis is not relevant to the 
65  Khelawon, supra note 5 at para. 46.
66  Khelawon, supra note 5 at para. 45.
67  Khelawon, supra note 5 at para. 39.
68  Khelawon, supra note 5 at para. 39.
69  Starr, supra note 1 at paras. 106, 153-55, 190.
70  Starr, supra note 1 at para. 217.
71  Khelawon, supra note 5 at para. 40.
72  Starr, supra note 1 at para. 217. See Suhail Akhtar, “Hearsay: The Denial of 
Confirmation”  (2005)  26  C.R.  (6th)  46  at  52.  See  also  Tanovich,  supra note 17 at 
402.
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declarant-unavailable context. Therefore, any discussion concerning 
why U.(F.J.) has survived Starr is moot, since Starr only affects authori-
ties within the declarant-unavailable lineage. It is therefore impossible 
for Starr to have overruled U.(F.J.).
   Justice  Rosenberg  delivers   reasons   reflecting   the   correct  posi-
tion. He points to the declarant’s availability in U.(F.J.) as the crucial 
defining  feature  between  U.(F.J.) and Starr, which permits “a full and 
meaningful cross-examination.”73 He emphasizes that “[w]here the de-
clarant is available the emphasis is not so much on the inherent reliabil-
ity of the statement itself but the safeguards in place to detect unreliabil-
ity.”74 Further, because the declarant’s availability “provides a powerful 
safeguard for discovering whether the prior out of court statement is 
true,” when a declarant is absent, it makes sense that Starr would hold 
“that the safeguards must be found in the circumstances surrounding the 
taking of the statement.”75
 Justice Rosenberg’s reasons indicate that threshold reliability is 
to be approached differently for declarant-unavailable and declarant-
available hearsay. In holding that U.(F.J.) does allow a court to move 
away from “the strictures of Starr where the declarant is available”, he 
indicates that U.(F.J.)’s “exception” is not universal and only applies to 
declarant-available hearsay.76
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
If consistency is to be achieved, a few simple rules must be fol-
lowed. As discussed, several cases since Starr have cited U.(F.J.) as 
authority for averting Starr’s strict threshold reliability analysis. It is 
therefore necessary to draw some boundaries around U.(F.J.)’s applica-
bility to guide courts in the future. 
 First, U.(F.J.) applies to declarant-available hearsay, which nec-
essarily involves prior inconsistent statements and a declarant with a 
present memory. Courts are cautioned that a declarant’s presence does 
not automatically trigger the declarant-available authorities. A true de-
clarant-available situation will only exist when the declarant remem-
73  Khelawon, supra note 5 at para. 111.
74  Khelawon, supra note 5 at para. 111.
75  Khelawon, supra note 5 at para. 113.
76  Khelawon, supra note at para. 111 [emphasis added]. 
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bers making the prior statement, so that meaningful cross-examination 
may be conducted. A present declarant who is claiming no memory will 
therefore necessitate the invocation of the declarant-unavailable author-
ities of Khan, Smith, and Starr.
 Second, U.(F.J.) applies to very few situations within the declar-
ant-­available  category.  Specifically,  U.(F.J.) condones resort to external 
evidence  within  strictly  confined  parameters  and  for  one  purpose  only:  
to determine whether or not “striking similarities” exist between state-
ments. In assessing “striking similarities,” the court should focus on 
evidence that goes to whether or not declarants have colluded, gained 
access to each other’s statement records, or rendered statements under 
the  influence  of  interrogators  or  third  parties.77 
 Third, the comparator statement invoked for determining the 
“striking similarity” must already be “substantively reliable” on its 
own.78 Presumably, this reliability would have to be based on the B.(K.
G.) indicators or the comparator declarant’s presence in court coupled 
with his adopting the prior statement. When resort to external evidence 
for threshold reliability is limited by these three conditions, U.(F.J.)’s 
effect  will  be  confined   to  cases  within   the  declarant-­available   family,  
and then, will seldom apply. After all, Chief Justice Lamer himself an-
ticipated that “statements so strikingly similar as to bolster their reli-
ability will be rare,” and therefore the “U.F.J. exception” will be excep-
tional.79 
CONCLUSION
Although Starr represents the Supreme Court of Canada’s latest word 
on declarant-unavailable hearsay, the subsequent jurisprudence indi-
cates otherwise. As courts and commentators have made clear, there are 
“valid reasons” for sustaining a distinction between declarant-available 
and declarant-unavailable threshold reliability analyses.80 However, this 
distinction has faltered, presumably because courts dealing with declar-
77  U.(F.J.), supra note 3 at para. 43.
78  U.(F.J.), supra note 3 at para. 44.
79  U.(F.J.), supra note 3 at para. 45.
80  Khelawon, supra note 5 at para. 45.
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ant-unavailable hearsay cases are using U.(F.J.) to avoid Starr’s thresh-
old reliability analysis. 
 Although the recent limits that Starr placed on threshold reli-
ability have been highly criticized, this is where the jurisprudence 
stands right now, and Starr’s threshold reliability restrictions should be 
respected. As Stuesser argues, Starr is the current “statement of the law 
that is to guide us in our future re-examination of other hearsay excep-
tions.”81 Therefore, it should be followed until the Supreme Court of 
Canada decides that the analysis needs to be changed and gives formal 
word on the issue. Further, since U.(F.J.) seems to have been rendered 
so  as  to  obtain  a  precise  result  on  specific  facts,  and  not  to  create  a  more  
flexible  analysis,  its  framework  should  be  resorted  to  with  caution.  
 The threshold reliability analyses for declarant-unavailable and 
declarant-available authorities must remain distinct if fair and consist-
ent legal results are to be achieved. Courts should not dabble in both 
worlds by taking what they like from the declarant-unavailable and de-
clarant-available categories and then applying custom-made analyses to 
their particular facts. When applying the principled approach to hearsay 
evidence, the courts must not have their cake and eat it too. 
81  Stuesser, supra note 12 at 75. 
